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Rape as an Act of Genocide: Definitions and Prosecutions as 
Established in Bosnia and Rwanda 
Bailey Fairbanks 
 
Rape and other acts of gender violence have been a contributing 
factor in all examples of modern genocide. However, it wasn’t 
until the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda prosecuted 
Jean Paul Akayesu that rape was officially considered a genocidal 
act. During the 1990s as both the International Criminal Tribunals 
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) were being held 
there were a number of breakthrough charges and convictions. 
These tribunals redefined the way that acts of sexual violence 
during genocide were legally classified.  
Despite huge changes in the conceptualized relationship 
between sexual violence and genocide, these changes have been 
less radical in their implication for prosecution. Since the trials in 
the 1990s, there have been fewer than fifty convictions of sexual 
violence in relation to genocide, crimes against humanity, or war 
crimes and fewer than one-hundred charges brought against people 
for these crimes. Although we have since seen examples of mass 
sexual violence during genocide in places like Darfur, it has not 
been prosecuted on the same scale as Bosnia or Rwanda. The 
ICTY and ICTR set precedents for the prosecution of crimes of 
sexual violence in times of genocide, creating new definitions that 
recognized the severity and interrelatedness of sexual violence and 
genocide. By exploring the historical setting, the demands of 
activist groups and intellectuals, and the events of the genocides in 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the circumstances of the time lead 
to the establishment of these precedents. However, since these 
precedents were set, prosecutors have not used them to prosecute 
similar crimes in other times of genocide or ethnic cleansing. It is 
due to the rigid nature of these definitions, a general sense of 
skepticism about the classification of sexual violence as an act 
genocide, and a disregard toward the unique experiences of sexual 
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assault victims in genocide that the precedents set by the ICTR and 
ICTY have not been applied to more current examples of genocide. 
As a foundation it is important to understand how sexual 
violence aligns with other forms of genocidal violence. While most 
modern scholars agree that rape is a form of genocidal violence 
and can be considered either a tool of genocide or weapon of war, 
there is some debate surrounding the place sexual violence has 
within genocide. Scholars like Martin Shaw and James E Waller 
argue that sexual violence is merely a tool used to perform a larger 
genocidal goal. Shaw writes, “Genocide seeks out all 
vulnerabilities’ and sexual violence may be a form of vulnerability 
in a specific context.”1 Similarly Waller argues that sexual 
violence is merely one of the many processes through which the 
characteristic “othering” of genocide can take place.  
In contrast to these views, scholars such as Joan Ringleheim and 
Dagmar Herzog argue that sexual violence is a reflective 
coordinate of genocide that is directly related to societal views of 
certain groups. Ringleheim examines female experiences of sexual 
violence during the Holocaust and concludes that the cases of 
sexual violence were directly related to “sexism and the division of 
social roles according to biological function,” 2 which put women 
at a disadvantage. Herzog made a similar connection between the 
treatment of homosexual men during the Holocaust and the Nazi’s 
“cultural attitudes and practices of sexuality”.3 However, she does 
take it a step further, considering sexual violence as soul murder. 
Soul murder equates the deliberate traumatization or deprivation 
by the perpetrator to the severity and finality of murder. In this 
way the victim is robbed of her identity and thus is damaged in a 
way Herzog argues in equivalent with other acts of genocide 
including murder. 
                                                          
1 Robin May Schott, “‘What is the Sex Doing in the Genocide’: A Feminist Philosophical 
Response,” European Journal of Women's Studies 22, no. 4 (2015): 400, accessed Fall 
2017, Women's Study International. 
2 Ibid., 401. 
3 Ibid., 402.  
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The scholarly argument that most closely aligns with the 
views of the ICTY and ICTR are those of scholars such like 
Catharine MacKinnon and Kelly Dawn Askin, who emphasize 
sexual violence as an integral component of genocide. MacKinnon 
argues that not only is sexual violence a key genocidal function, 
but that it has a greater capacity than other forms of violence to 
damage the targeted groups. She writes that when rape occurs, “a 
specific tool of domination is selected…When men rape and do not 
kill, or rape and then kill, or kill and then rape, the same is true in 
genocide.”4 MacKinnon makes the argument that rape is as 
genocidal and often more impactful than other acts of genocide 
like murder. Dawn Askin supports this argument by positing that 
sexual assault satisfies all five components of the definition of 
genocide as described by the United Nations. 
 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
A. Killing members of the group; 
B. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
C. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part; 
D. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
E. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.5 
 
                                                          
4 Catharine MacKinnon, “Genocide’s Sexuality,” in Are Women Human? And Other 
International Dialogues (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 210.  
5 “United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.” 
United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.html. 
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 Legally, this is the argument made by the ICTY and ICTR when 
the decision to prosecute acts of sexual violence as acts of 
genocide.  
Although sexual and gender violence were important aspects 
of both the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, Bosnia was the 
first case of widespread systematic rape as an organized part of 
genocide. Theorist Pascale R. Bos acknowledges that “the most 
significant incidents of large-scale rape were reported in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1992-93.”6 Weitsman explains the relationship of 
sexual violence to genocidal killing as she states, “In the case of 
the wars in the former Yugoslavia, wholesale slaughter of identity 
groups went hand in hand with forced impregnation campaigns. 
These policies, undertaken for the purpose of actually eliminating, 
biologically, an ethnic or religious group.”7 Bos points out that it is 
difficult to know the exact number of cases of sexual violence, but 
the estimates range anywhere from 30,000 to 50,000. These 
number reflect the women who were raped during the forced 
impregnation campaigns as well as women who were raped to 
negate their perceived honor or societal position. Genocidal rape is 
as deeply tied to identity and societally constructed values as 
genocidal killings are to racial or religious identities. Weitsman 
continues, “Policies of sexual violence in wartime are predicated 
on these conceptions of gender roles within the larger context of 
ethnic identity.”8 Genocidal rape is unique in its intersectional 
consideration of ethnic identity and gender roles as many other 
genocidal acts are predicated much more singularly on religious or 
ethnic identities.  
                                                          
6 Pascale R. Bos, “Feminists Interpreting the Politics of Wartime Rape: Berlin, 1945; 
Yugoslavia, 1992-1993,” Journal of Women in Culture and Society 31, no. 4 (Summer 
2006): 1012, accessed Fall 2017, Historical Abstracts with Full Text. 
7 Patricia A. Weitsman, “Constructions of Identity and Sexual Violence in Wartime: The 
Case of Bosnia,” in Genocide and Gender in the Twentieth Century, ed. Amy E. Randall 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 121.    
8 Ibid., 123.  
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 While Bosnia was the first case of mass rape as a function of 
perpetuating genocide, it the breakthrough case of The 
International Criminal Tribunal involved no charges related to 
genocide. Doris Buss describes the case saying, “The decision by 
the Yugoslav tribunal in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and 
Vukovic was the first case where the charges related solely to 
sexual violence crimes, though genocide charges were not 
pursued.”9 Although charges of genocide were not pursued, this 
landmark case, in conjunction with the similar cases in Rwanda, 
sanctioned that perpetrators can be charged with crimes that did 
not directly involve death or end of life. These men were charged 
with crimes such as rape and enslavement and these crimes were 
classified as crimes against humanity and war crimes. Previously 
crimes of this nature were viewed as honor crimes and were not 
prosecuted at the larger trials, if they were prosecuted at all. 
It is important to note that the decisions to prosecute crimes 
of sexual violence did not stem directly from the ICTY or ICTR, 
but from feminist activists who pushed for these crimes to be taken 
seriously and prosecuted in a way that acknowledged the severity. 
The decision to prosecute crimes of sexual violence as crimes 
against humanity and war crimes during the ICTY did not come 
directly out of ICTY leader’s motivations. Feminist activists were 
not alone in this fight as many scholars were also pushing for a 
reform of the UN’s policies. Bos recalls their fight, “From 1992 
on, when increasingly more reports on these rapes became 
public…feminists in the Balkans as well as in the rest of Europe 
and the United States started calling for intervention.”10 Feminist 
sociologist such as Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis argued 
that nationalism and its ideologies are deeply rooted in gender 
ideologies. This correlation between nationalism and gender 
ideologies was the foundation for the argument that genocide in 
                                                          
9 Doris Buss, “Making Sense of Genocide, Making Sense of Law: International Criminal 
Prosecutions of Large-Scale Sexual Violence,” in Genocide and Gender in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. Amy E. Randall (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 282. 
10 Bos, “Feminists Interpreting the Politics of Wartime Rape,” 1012. 
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not solely motivated by nationalism or a desire for ethnic purity 
but also by gender ideologies.  
The argument inextricably linking nationalism and gender 
ideologies made by Anthias and Yuval-Davis, was used as a 
platform for the argument that the rape campaigns in Yugoslavia 
were the effects of nationalism and gender working together 
toward a genocidal cause. In the early half of the 1990’s as the 
violence in Yugoslavia and Rwanda was unfolding, many activists 
were appealing to the international community to take the crimes 
of sexual violence seriously and to prosecute them appropriately. 
Catharine MacKinnon wrote an article in Ms. Magazine arguing 
that the rape should be seen as genocide. A year later, in 1994 
Alexandra Stiglmayer published Mass Rape: The War Against 
Women in Bosnia, focusing on the role rape plays as a function of 
genocide. It is largely through this activism and the attention that it 
garnered that rape was prosecuted as a legitimate crime and act of 
genocide during the ICTY and ICTR, shaping international 
humanitarian law. 
 Alongside Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic, the 
two cases from Rwanda that helped shape the precedent for 
prosecuting rape in genocide are Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu 
and Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyriamasuhuko. Jennie E. Burnett 
describes the importance of the Akayesu case saying, “The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established 
sexual violence as an explicit strategy of the genocide and yielded 
the first judgement of rape as a genocide crime in an international 
court.”11The case against Akayesu was the first case in which rape 
was prosecuted as a crime of genocide and a crime against 
humanity. Originally, he was not indicted on any charges related to 
sexual violence. However, after hearing the testimonies of multiple 
women who spoke openly about rape, even when the questions did 
                                                          
11Jennie E. Burnett, “Rape as a Weapon of Genocide: Gender, Patriarchy, and Sexual 
Violence in Rwanda,” in Genocide and Gender in the Twentieth Century, ed. Amy E. 
Randall (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 147. 
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not pertain to rape or sexual violence, that the court decided to 
amend Akayesu’s indictment. Usta Kaitesi writes,  
 
In a hearing held on 17 June 1994, prosecution counsel 
submitted an oral motion to amend Akayesu’s indictment. In 
justifying the amendment prosecution witnesses expressed 
that the testimonies of Witness J and H had helped the 
prosecution to link the evidence on rape and sexual violence 
to the actions of the accused.12  
 
It is this ruling that is used to create the guidelines for prosecuting 
rape as crime against humanity and a crime of genocide.  
 The Trial Chamber outlined guiding definitions that state 
when rape and crimes of sexual violence can be considered acts of 
genocide or crimes against humanity. The Trial Chamber states 
that sexual violence and rape, “constitute genocide in the same 
way as any other act as long as they were committed with the 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, 
targeted as such.”13 This meant that as long as the crimes of sexual 
violence were in accordance with the United Nations definition of 
genocide and any of the five components of genocide outlined in 
the definition the crimes can be prosecuted as crimes of genocide. 
Similarly, the Trial Chamber set out specific guidelines for the 
prosecution of sexual violence as crimes against humanity. The 
Chamber wrote, “Rape and sexual violence constitute crimes 
against humanity as long as they are: (a) part of a widespread or 
systematic attack; (b) on a civilian population; (c) on curtained 
catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, 
political, racial, or religious grounds.” 14 These definitions lay out 
                                                          
12 Usta Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence: The Legacy of the ICTR, 
Rwanda’s Ordinary courts and Gacaca Courts (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014), 128. 
13 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Indictment Documents (International Criminal Tribunal 
Rwanda September 2, 1998). 
14 Ibid.  
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the possibilities for determining acts of sexual violence as either 
genocidal or crimes against humanity.  
 These guidelines were applied directly to the case against 
Pauline Nyriamasuhuko. Much like Akayesu, Nyriamasuhuko was 
charged with acts of sexual violence as part of her participation in 
the genocide. The groundbreaking aspect of this case was 
Nyriamasuhuko’s gender. Nicole Hogg and Mark Drumbl wrote 
about the case saying, “Nyriamasuhuko is the ICTR’s only female 
accused. She is, moreover, the only woman tried and convicted by 
an international tribunal for the specific crime of genocide and the 
only woman tried and convicted by an international tribunal for 
rape as a crime against humanity.”15 This ruling welcomed a whole 
new level of reform into international humanitarian law, as well as 
domestic law, as a woman was being charged with rape. Indicted a 
woman on these charges challenges the traditional 
perpetrator/victim narrative. However, it is important to note that 
the Chamber failed to prosecute or convict Nyriamasuhuko for 
genocidal acts of sexual violence.  
 This failure works to set a precedent of on some level, by 
prosecuting Akayesu’s crimes as acts of genocide and 
Nyriamasuhuko’s crimes as crimes against humanity this 
establishes a difference in severity between the acts carried out by 
these perpetrators, adhering to the societal narrative of perpetrator 
and victim along gender lines. Although prosecuters were able to 
hold Nyriamasuhuko accountable for genocide and sexual violence 
separately, the failure to prosecute her for the crimes in relation to 
each other, like they had done with Akayesu, speaks to an inability 
to view similar crimes carried out by men and women as equal in 
severity and implication. Nyriamasuhuko was involved in acts of 
sexual violence in very proximal ways to those Akayesu was tried 
for, but the charges brought against Nyriamasuhuko were 
                                                          
15 Nicole Hogg and Mark Drumbl, “Women as Perpetrators: Agency and Authority on 
Genocidal Rwanda,” in Genocide and Gender in the Twentieth Century, ed. Amy E. 
Randall (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 199. 
 
8
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 23 [2019], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol23/iss1/13
 117 
differentiated. At times, when reading the case notes and the 
Chamber’s comments it seems as though they were unable to see 
Nyriamasuhuko’s crimes as independent acts and focused heavily 
on the influence of male leaders around her rather than 
acknowledging her autonomy and her ability to make decisions 
independent of those around her.  
 By establishing the precedent of adhering to gender roles and 
set ideologies of perpetrator and victim in the Nyriamasuhuko 
ruling, that the breakthroughs in genocidal definitions made during 
the Akayesu and Nyriamasuhuko cases are ultimately stunted. The 
rigid nature of the definitions created by the ICTY and ICTR, a 
general sense of skepticism about the classification of sexual 
violence as acts genocide, and a disregard toward the unique 
experiences of sexual assault victims in genocide upholds the less 
nuanced accounts of victims and perpetrators as established in 
previous genocides. Joshua Kaiser and John Hagan examine the 
issues with these accounts stating, “Accounts of mass atrocities 
habitually focus on one kind of violence and its archetypal victim, 
inviting uncritical, ungendered misconceptions: for example, rape 
only impacts women; genocide is only about dead battle aged 
men.”16 These misconceptions continue on even after the Trial 
Chambers in Rwanda and Yugoslavia created the possibility of 
prosecuting crimes of sexual violence in a legitimate way.  
 This issue is twofold. In the feminist attempt to urge the 
international community to prosecute rape appropriately the focus 
often centered on female only narratives of sexual violence and 
victim only narratives of female participation in the war, which in 
turn was mirrored at the ICTY and ICTR. Although the majority of 
people subject to sexual violence during both genocides were 
women, there were cases of male focused rape and sexual violence, 
but often these cases go unreported or untried. Bos discusses the 
                                                          
16 Joshua Kaiser and John Hagan, “Gendered Genocide: The Socially Destructive Process 
of Genocidal Rape, Killing, and Displacement in Darfur,” Law & Society Review 49, no. 
1 (2015): 69, accessed Fall 2017. 
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implications of neglecting these narratives writing, “In the end, by 
focusing exclusively on the victimization of women in this 
conflict, feminist analyses suggest all women were victims and 
only victims, and therefore by definition not participants in the 
war.”17 Left out of this critique by Bos is the compounding neglect 
of men as victims, by forcing women into a victim only narrative 
and men in a perpetrator only narrative there is a disregard for 
cases that oppose these narratives.  
 Working in tandem with simplification of victim and 
perpetrator narratives is the misunderstanding of the legal 
requirements for genocidal rape or rape as a crime against 
humanity. Kaiser and Hagan highlight this and tie it to the 
simplification of victim narratives, “Yet even experts who accept 
these arguments [rape as a form of genocide] in theory have 
trouble understanding how- and therefore when- such violence is 
genocidal. Absence of the genocide label reduces humanitarian and 
political aid, changes legal requirements, hinders public and 
scholarly understandings, and all but invalidates survivors’ 
experiences.” 18 This lack of understanding and its consequent 
underuse of the classification have tangible effects on survivors of 
more contemporary genocides.  
 Turning to Darfur for evidence, we see that although there 
are high numbers of cases of sexual violence carried out during the 
genocide, none of these crimes are being classified as crimes of 
genocide. According to the International Criminal Court in Darfur 
(ICC), the current investigations that started in 2005 revealed 
crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
However, rape was only classified under war crimes and crimes 
against humanity and the court documents only refer to the rape of 
women in the charges brought against perpetrators.19 However, in 
many people’s testimonies, including women’s, the rape that they 
recall is perpetrated against men and boys. In the article, “Gender-
                                                          
17 Bos, “Feminists Interpreting the Politics of Wartime Rape,” 1020. 
18 Kaiser and Hagan, “Gendered Genocide,” 70.  
19 “Darfur, Sudan.” International Criminal Court. https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur. 
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Based Violence Against Men and Boys in Darfur: The Gender-
Genocide Nexus,” it is written that one, “21-year-old Masaleit 
woman recounted a key method of emasculation: rape. Rape 
preceded and followed murder, and groups of soldiers and 
Janjaweed typically used penile penetration or objects, such as 
sticks and gun barrels, against groups of Darfuri men.”20 
Throughout the article the authors provide countless testimonies 
that echo these experiences, men and boys raped by soldiers in 
order to emasculate and humiliate them.  
 Through not recognizing these acts of rape legally in the 
same way acts of rape and sexual violence against women are 
recognized, the ICC is only deepening the resistance to recognize 
the nuances of the roles of perpetrator and victim. Kaiser and 
Hagan comment on this saying, “Such arguments encourage 
dangerous assumptions that only women experience sexual assault, 
that only men perpetrate it, that only women interpret it and that 
women experience no other victimization.”21 It is through these 
rigid interpretations of victim and perpetrator roles and how those 
roles are in conversation with societally constructed gender roles 
that the prosecution of gender and sexual violence during genocide 
is being stunted.  
 Although there were major breakthroughs in international 
humanitarian law at the end of the 20th century, these 
breakthroughs continue to be inhibited by strict interpretations of 
gender roles and victim and perpetrator roles. These strict 
interpretations work together with the misunderstanding of the 
policy laid out by the ICTY and ICTR to restrict the use of sexual 
violence as a crime of genocide in more contemporary examples. It 
seems that unless it is as clear cut as the Akayesu case, meaning 
the man in power inflicts rape and sexual violence on women in 
the victim group, there is an international hesitation to prosecute 
                                                          
20 Gabrielle Ferrales, Hollie Nyseth Brehm, and Suzy Mcelrath, “Gender-Based Violence 
Against Men and Boys in Darfur,” Gender & Society 30, no. 4 (August 2016): 573, 
accessed Fall 2017, Women's Study International. 
21 Kaiser and Hagan, “Gendered Genocide,” 81.  
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crimes of sexual violence as acts of genocide. If the narrative 
strays even slightly, like in the case of Nyriamasuhuko, the 
international community is unable to reconcile the preconceived 
notions of gender roles and victim/perpetrator leaving them unable 
to hold perpetrators accountable for their crimes in the appropriate 
way. This hesitation is seen again in the ICC for Darfur’s 
prosecution of sexual violence. Those that they are holding 
accountable are men who raped women, although there is evidence 
to support the systematic rape of men as a form of emasculation 
before and after their deaths. By viewing men as victims to male 
perpetrator the genocide in Darfur strays from the typical narrative 
and therefore forces the international community to recognize that 
their rigid definitions of genocidal crimes do not hold up to the 
realities of genocide. 
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